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Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 78 (Oct. 2, 2014)1 
 
SECURITIES LAW: TRANSFER AGENT DUTIES 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that (1) Nevada statutory law partially abrogates common law by 
making a stock transfer agent’s duty the same as the issuer’s in processing a request to register a 
transfer of securities; and (2) a transfer agent’s statutory duty to process legend removal requests 
does not arise without the stockholder’s request to act.  
Additionally, the Court reaffirmed the liability of a transfer agent to a stockholder for 
common law claims asserting misfeasance.   
 
Background 
I. 
 
Appellants Paul Guilfoyle and Citypoint, LLC (collectively Guilfoyle) held stock that 
carried a restrictive legend in Pegasus Wireless Corporation. The restrictive legend required 
registration under Federal Securities laws or an exemption therefrom before the stock could be 
resold or transferred. When Guilfoyle believed the stock qualified for SEC Rule 44 exemption, 
he asked his broker about removing the legend and reselling the stock. 
Guilfoyle’s broker made an anonymous call to Respondent Olde Monmouth Stock 
Transfer Company, Inc., Pegasus’s transfer agent. The broker asked from whom Olde Monmouth 
would accept a legal opinion supporting legend removals from restricted Pegasus stock. Olde 
Monmouth offered the contact information for Pegasus’s designated counsel, John Courtade, 
who declined to provide an opinion without Pegasus’s direction. Guilfoyle’s did not 
communicate further with Olde Monmouth, and several subsequent attempts to contact Pegasus 
were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, Pegasus stock plummeted before Guilfoyle could sell his stock. 
Once Guilfoyle learned that two of Pegasus’s officers were convicted for defrauding 
investors, he sued and recovered judgment against them. Consequently, Pegasus filed bankruptcy 
and Guilfoyle commenced suit against Olde Monmouth. Guilfoyle faulted Olde Monmouth 
because they did not disclose that, under internal procedures for removing legends under SEC 
Rule 144, independent counsel could provide a legal opinion if Pegasus was unresponsive or that 
Courtade was the fourth counsel Pegasus had designated within the preceding year. Guilfoyle 
brought claims for (1) violation of statutory duty to timely process removal requests; (2) 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) aiding and abetting Pegasus’s officers’ breach of 
fiduciary duty; and (4) conspiracy. Guilfoyle appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Olde Monmouth. 
 
Discussion 
II. 
A. 
 
 At common law, a transfer agent was not liable to a corporation’s stockholder because 
the failure to remove restrictive legends was nonfeasance. The transfer agent was liable only to 
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the corporation, which in turn was liable to shareholders.  In Nevada, however, NRS 104.84012 
and NRS 104.8407 make a transfer agent’s duty the same as an issuing corporation’s “in 
performing the statutory functions involved in processing a request” to remove restrictive 
legends from stock.3  
The statutory "duty to register transfers exists only if: [1] a registered security is 
presented to it; [2] the certificate is accompanied by a request to register the transfers; and [3] the 
requestor has satisfied the preconditions that subsection 8-401(1) authorizes the issuer to impose 
before registering the transfer. Thus, “Presentation of a properly supported request … is the sine 
qua non of an NRS 104.8401 claim.” Here, the Court rejected Guilfoyle’s argument that Olde 
Monmouth violated its statutory duties by refusing to timely process his request for legend 
removal because not of the aforementioned requirements were met. First, the “brief telephone 
call … did not meet the statute’s requirements for a request,” because Guilfoyle’s broker never 
asked Olde Monmouth to remove the legend. Second, Guilfoyle failed to present his shares. 
Third, Walters did not identify Guilfoyle or his circumstances, so Olde Monmouth would have 
had no way of knowing whether Guilfoyle could meet the requirements in NRS 104.8401(1). 
Therefore, the Court held that the statutory transfer process was never engaged and Olde 
Monmouth assumed no statutory duty. 
B. 
 
For claims asserting misfeasance, on the other hand, transfer agents remain liable to 
stockholders at common law. Although Guilfoyle’s common law claims asserted malfeasance, 
the Court concluded they were not supported by competent evidence.  
 
1. 
 
First, the negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims failed, because Olde 
Monmouth did not “supply false information.” The Court held that Olde Monmouth offered 
truthful information to the broker’s telephone inquiry: Courtade was Pegasus’s designated 
counsel. The Court concluded that Guilfoyle offered no evidence to support his conjectural 
argument that Olde Monmouth purposely sent his broker on a “wild goose chase” to avoid 
processing his request pointing to 26 instances where Pegasus removed legends when asked. 
Likewise, Guilfoyle offered no evidence to establish a special relationship with Olde Monmouth 
that would give rise to full disclosure. Since Olde Monmouth did not supply false information, 
Guilfoyle’s misrepresentation claims failed.  
 
2. 
 
Second, Guilfoyle’s aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty claim failed, 
because no evidence suggested that Olde Monmouth “knowingly and substantially participated 
in or encouraged” Pegasus’s breach.  
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3. 
 
Finally, Guilfoyle’s conspiracy claim failed because there was “no [direct or 
circumstantial] evidence of an agreement or intent to harm the plaintiff.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Olde Monmouth’s statutory duty never arose because Guilfoyle failed to engage the 
statutory process by submitting a transfer request. Furthermore, Guilfoyle’s common law claims 
were not supported by competent evidence. The Court affirmed summary judgment for Olde 
Monmouth. 
 
